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P     saying in the current state
of literary studies as the recognition that Michel Foucault’s work has reversed a
traditional assumption of literature’s opposition to, or detachment from, regimes
of government. In Discipline and Punish Foucault argued that the human sciences
and the history of penal law were part of a single ‘‘epistemological-juridical forma-
tion’’ originating in investigative procedures that administered pain in the name
of eliciting the truth of a crime and displaying its purgation. He traced an unbroken
line from the twelfth-century church’s establishment of confessional and inquisito-
rial techniques of juridical investigation through the early modern arrogation of
such techniques to the power of the sovereign state, to demonstrate that such judi-
cial investigation has been the ‘‘crude, but fundamental element in the constitution
of the empirical sciences’’ from the eighteenth century onward.1 Literary scholars
have responded to this suggestion of an investigative and penal element in all hu-
manist discourses by ingeniously reconﬁguring what were once considered merely
formal and generic questions.2
Among such questions are those of critics of English Renaissance tragedy who
have either chosen to see it as anticipatory of Foucauldian discipline in its capac-
ity to fashion self-regulating subjects, or have brought to the traditional critical pre-
occupation with its violence a new awareness that spectacles of legally inﬂicted
pain are demonstrations of sovereign power. Thus, of the latter critics, Karen Cun-
ningham has interpreted Christopher Marlowe’s theatrical representations of vio-
lence as conscious subversions of the attempts of Tudor monarchs to establish their
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authority through elaborately staged public executions, while of the former, Ste-
ven Mullaney has seen Shakespeare’sMeasure for Measure as a critical reﬂection on
the rise of ‘‘a theater of apprehension,’’ producing in its audience a form of self-
awareness that served as ‘‘an expanded avenue of access for social and cultural
control.’’3
Common to both ‘‘disciplinary’’ and ‘‘spectacular’’ emphases in the Foucaul-
dian interpretation of Renaissance tragedy, however, has been the underlying
assumption that English judicial investigations are always identiﬁed with, and ad-
ministered by, the state. It is also assumed, in accordance with Foucault’s Kantoro-
wiczian understanding of early modernmonarchy, that this state has taken over the
theological claims to truth and inquisitorial methods of the church. There is simply
no room, in these accounts of the relationship between early modern English the-
ater and earlymodern penal culture, for any understanding of the workings of crim-
inal justice as being thought of, historically, as a communal responsibility, depen-
dent on lay instigation and lay participation in judgment. When, for example,
James Shapiro proposes a competitive relation between the Elizabethan theater
and state spectacles of punishment, he quotes from a contemporary source that
cutpurses caught pilfering at a play might be tied to a post on the stage for the
people to wonder at. ‘‘When actors punish cutpurses onstage,’’ asks Shapiro, ‘‘is
it still theater? Theater within theater? A state within theater?’’4 Likewise, when
Elizabeth Hanson introduces her cultural-historical argument that Renaissance
England saw the emergence of a new tendency to construe people as objects of
oﬃcial investigative knowledge, she quotes Hamlet’s anger with Guildenstern for
trying to ‘‘pluck out the heart of mymystery,’’ commenting that ‘‘Hamlet’s imagery
here links his situation both to the culmination of many discovering operations of
the Elizabethan state, the extraction and display of the traitor’s heart at execution,
and tomoments of resistance to such operations.’’5While both Shapiro andHanson
are insightful about the relationship between theater and penal practice, they en-
courage us to overlook the possibility that the detection of criminality and the right
to judge it may have ﬁgured in popular English consciousness as, at least in part,
the responsibility of the people. Sticking with Hanson’s example of Hamlet for the
moment, we could ask what happens to her suggestion of a state monopoly on oper-
ations of discovery when we acknowledge the narrative importance of the play’s
detective element. What should we make of the well-known fact that Hamlet him-
self pursues, as a kind of amateur detective, the same kind of judicial investigation
into another’s conscience and hidden motives that Rosencrantz and Guildenstern
have been employed to make into his? The play’s compulsion as drama depends
not just on our sense of Hamlet’s resistance to being constructed by state powers
of investigation but also on our identiﬁcation with his own detective impulse, his
enthusiasm for fiction as a means to aid him in the probing of questions of guilt.
Indeed, whenHamlet prepares Horatio to look out for signs of Claudius’s ‘‘occulted
guilt’’ revealing itself in his reaction to the play, Horatio responds by wryly identi-
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fying himself with the community’s traditional responsibility to help victims of
crime in their detective work: ‘‘If a steal aught while this play is playing / And scape
detecting, I will pay the theft,’’ he assures Hamlet.6 The joke here depends on peo-
ple recalling the custom of assessing the entire community—the hundred—for
payment of compensation to the victim if, after a hue and cry, a criminal had not
been tracked down and apprehended.7What, then, happens to a Foucauldian read-
ing when we acknowledge the traces of a communal justice system informing the
representation ofHamlet’s own investigation? Such an acknowledgment would also
involve recognizing that the activity of lay detection ﬁgures, in such revenge trag-
edies as Hamlet, not simply as a subject of mimetic representation, but as a herme-
neutic principle, an aspect of plot, on which the intelligibility and credibility of dra-
matic action and of character depends.
Without, then, denying that Foucault’s analysis has made the violence of the
Renaissance theater newly legible, I want in this paper to argue for the value of
shifting our attention from the Renaissance theater’s visual impact (its ‘‘stagings,’’
‘‘spectacles,’’ or ‘‘displays’’ of violence) in order to think, instead, about the forensic
rhetoric of plot. I want, further, to suggest that even in revenge tragedy, the bloodiest
of genres, the shaping epistemology of plot is not that of Foucault’s ‘‘spectacle of the
scaﬀold’’ but is, rather, derived from the common ground that English dramatists
perceived to exist between the forensically based plots of Latin intrigue comedy
and the popular practices of detection and evidence evaluation that deﬁned their
own culture of trial by jury.8 In the ﬁnal stages of my argument I will show how
Titus Andronicus, a play once likened to ‘‘a broken down cart, laden with bleeding
corpses from an Elizabethan scaﬀold,’’ is actually a perfect example of how Elizabe-
than revenge tragedy is self-consciously plotted to distinguish the participatory,
open, and adversarial jury trial from the inquisitorial system Foucault described.9
The connection I am proposing between English revenge tragedy and the de-
tective plot is not completely without precedent in critical discourse, but it has not
been developed in ways that take seriously the idea that a participatory justice sys-
tem might have had an impact on dramatic epistemology and vice versa. In 1923
T. S. Eliot observed that the element of plot in plays such as Shakespeare’s Hamlet
and Thomas Kyd’s Spanish Tragedy seemed to point less to their supposed Senecan
sources than to the plots of modern detective drama, but he did not speculate as to
the cause.10 More recently John Kerrigan has explored links between the tracking
motifs of tragedy, revenge drama, and detective ﬁction from Sophocles to Sherlock
Holmes, suggesting that all these genres express a universal expiatory impulse to-
ward retribution. However, although Kerrigan’s sense of the Sherlock Holmesian
aﬃnities of Elizabethan revenge tragedy is informed by work on the links between
the poetics of Greek tragedy and Greek forensic oratory, he warns against applying
the Greek parallel directly to sixteenth-century England: ‘‘Greek legal process,’’ he
writes, ‘‘had for centuries beforeThe Orestiamore closely resembledTVdrama than
did, for instance, the assize courts known to Kyd (who was by training a legal scriv-
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ener).’’11 Perhaps; and yet the Athenian legal system did resemble that of sixteenth-
century England inasmuch as Athenian cases were often decided by a panel of lay
judges or dikasts—a kind of jury.12 And it is the Anglo-American jury trial, ac-
cording to Carol Clover, that is the key to understanding the extraordinary gener-
ativity of plot and plotting strategies in twentieth-century popular genres, such as
the TV drama to which Kerrigan likens the forensic plots of Greek tragedy. Clover
emphasizes the jury trial’s characteristic appeal, through the oral presentation of
evidence in the courtroom, to the evaluative ingenuity and generic expectations
of the audience-as-jury.13 What seems helpful about Clover’s model, by contrast
with Kerrigan’s, is the way it links the investigative energy of the plot or narrative
structure of the ﬁlm or drama to an emotional and intellectual appeal to the audi-
ence as lay judges, thus throwing the emphasis simultaneously on the audience’s in-
tellectual capacity to puzzle out what the plot presents as ‘‘evidence’’ and on its
ethical arbitration of what that evidence implies. Sixteenth-century English re-
venge tragedy, while not presenting us with competing narratives of the facts as
such, nevertheless makes a similar open-ended appeal to our capacity as equitable
moral arbiters of the case.14
As Joel Altman says of Hieronimo in Kyd’s Spanish Tragedy, only the theater
audience is ﬁnally in a position to ‘‘judge him in the light of all the circumstances,’’
and thereby to ‘‘show compassion for the cause.’’15 Compassion for Hieronimo’s
cause, incidentally, is necessarily also awareness of the need for regime change.
Likewise, in the last scene of Titus Andronicus, Lucius addresses a ‘‘gracious audi-
tory’’ of Roman senators, telling them of the wrongs that have driven Titus to mur-
der their emperor and empress, while Marcus, Titus’s brother and a Roman tri-
bune, asks them to ‘‘judge what cause had Titus to revenge.’’16 Here, as in Horatio’s
charge to tell Hamlet’s story, the theater audience assumes the position of the ‘‘peo-
ple’’ who are to be judges of all the circumstances that led to the regicidal massacre,
and, as such, to participate in an act of critical judgment that has both moral and
political dimensions. What are the implications of such an appeal to the audience?
In order to ﬁnd out, we have to start by revisiting Foucault’s political anatomy of
early modern penal practice so as to compare the epistemological foundations
of criminal jurisdiction in early modern France and England.
Foucault’s ‘‘Spectacle of
the Scaffold’’ and the
Roman-Canon System of Proof
Foucault’s governing metaphor of the scaﬀold as spectacle or theater—
the political spectacle of intense pain that reaﬃrms the body of the king and hence
the body politic—has, I have already suggested, become routinely used in the criti-
cism of the English Renaissance tragedy. And yet, in Foucault’s argument, the ordi-
nary spectacle of penal violence is integrally related to a speciﬁc system of evidence
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evaluation that, in its underlying logic, bears no relation to the English understand-
ing of evidence or of what constitutes or who decides the ‘‘truth’’ of what happened
in a criminal case.
When critics of English Renaissance drama cite Foucault’s ‘‘famous description
of punishment,’’ focusing on his pronouncements that ‘‘public torture and execu-
tion must be spectacular,’’ they seem to forget that public torture was only half
of the story.17 In fact, the spectacle of punishment in which the condemned body
participates acquires its meaning in Foucault’s account only in relation to the regu-
lated secret administration of torture prior to the sentence. The tortured body
aﬃrms, ‘‘open for all to see, the truth of the crime,’’ because that truth has already
been arrived at according to ‘‘rigorous rules’’ and ‘‘formal constraints’’ governing
the professional judges’ weighing, in secret, of diﬀerent kinds of evidence, of which
a confession extracted under torture was one.18 These procedures, as Foucault ex-
plains, had been deﬁned in the Middle Ages and elaborated by Renaissance civil-
ians: they are known to legal historians as the ‘‘Roman-canon system of evidence,’’
for they derive from ecclesiastical inquisitorial tribunals. The Roman-canon system
was established as part of the penal code in France a century after the abolition of
the judicial ordeal and was further codiﬁed in the Ordinance of Blois (1498), the
Ordinance of Villers-Cotterets (1539), and, beyond the Renaissance, but within the
period Foucault treats, the criminal ordinance of 1670.19 Brieﬂy, its main features
were that it was an inquisitorial system—that is to say, it did not depend on criminal
accusations being made by injured parties in the community—and it was operated
in the name of the crown, by professional judges. From preliminary investigation
through examination of the accused, confrontation, examination of defense wit-
nesses, ‘‘question extraordinaire,’’ or torture to the conviction, the process was entirely
conducted in secret.
Foucault’s account, stressing the symmetry and interdependence of public spec-
tacle and secret examination of evidence, dwells less on the stages of preliminary
inquiry, accusation, and confrontation than it does on the theory of legal proofs
that dictated the judge’s procedure from stage to stage. Foucault describes, vividly,
themeticulous ‘‘penal arithmetic’’ that the Roman-canon system adapted fromRo-
man orators’ discussions of ‘‘artiﬁcial proof.’’20 According to this arithmetic, as Bar-
bara Shapiro has written,
two unexceptional witnesses constituted a full proof, one doubtful and one unexceptional
witness, added up to something more than a half proof, but not a full proof. Other types of
evidence, such as ‘‘common fame’’ or private, as opposed to public, documents, also were
considered half-proof. . . . In criminal causes, one witness—no matter how good or how
reliable—could never result in conviction. Without a confession, two witnesses were abso-
lutely essential. In this way the law encouraged and, indeed often required, the torture of
the accused in order to produce a confession.21
As one of Foucault’s sources, Adhe´mar Esmein, observed in his 1882 study, the aim
of the process was to devise a set of mechanical rules for weighing the evidence
35Rethinking the ‘‘Spectacle of the Scaﬀold’’
regardless of the opinion of the judge: ‘‘mis en face de ces preuves,’’ Esmein writes,
‘‘il doit ne´cessairement condamner; peu importe dans l’une ou l’autre hypothe`se
sa conviction intime. . . . Le judge est comme un clavier, qui re´pond ine´vitablement
lorsqu’on frappe certaines touches.’’22Once the proofs added up, therewas no possi-
bility of contradictory evidence of the accused’s innocence, of the so-called ‘‘fait
justiﬁcatif ’’ weighing against conviction.23 Foucault sums up the paradoxical ten-
dency of this process to the extraction of confession through torture: ‘‘Written, se-
cret, subjected, in order to construct its proofs, to rigorous rules, the penal investiga-
tion was a machine that might produce the truth in the absence of the accused.
And by this very fact, though the law strictly speaking did not require it, this proce-
dure was to tend necessarily to the confession.’’24 It is, of course, this secretly pro-
duced confession, ‘‘complement to the written, secret preliminary investigation,’’
that Foucault analyzes at length as the coerced, ritualized production of an authen-
ticating guarantor of the rightness of the conviction, both in the form of torture
and of public execution. Hence it is that he insists on the distinction between the
unrestrained torture of modern investigations and this torture, which ‘‘occupied a
strict place in a complex penal mechanism,’’ a two-part evidentiary mechanism for
producing truth.25
English Jury Trial:
Witness Testimony as Evidence
Rather than Proof
That the sixteenth-century English system of criminal justice in no way
resembled this ‘‘penal mechanism’’ has not deterred the application of Foucault’s
model of the juridical production of the French monarch’s power to its English
counterpart. And this is not surprising. For while, as is well known, the abolition
of judicial ordeal in England in 1215 resulted not, as in France, in the extension of
the Roman-canon inquisitorial system to criminal procedure, but in the establish-
ment of trial by jury, other points of similarity between the French and English
penal systems have seemed to override this diﬀerence. Foucault himself notes, per-
haps because of the role model of jury trial, that England was ‘‘one of the countries
most loath to see the disappearance of the public execution.’’26 And, in any case,
what Renaissance critics have learned from Foucault is how to read accounts of
public executions as dramatic texts.27 There are no transcripts of what took place
at the oral jury trial (apart from treason trials), and there has been a corresponding
tendency to underestimate the impact of its diﬀusion of habits of thought and prac-
tice through the culture. Publication by J. S. Cockburn of indictments recorded
from the assize courts of the Home Circuit for the reigns of Elizabeth and James
in the ten volumes that make up the Calendar of Assize Records (1975–82), along with
Cockburn’s articles analyzing his ﬁndings, has surely done much to deter taking
jury trial in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries seriously. Cockburn’s reserva-
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tions about the possibility of meaningful evaluation of evidence taking place in jury
trial are many and are reiterated in various places. I will take up his arguments at
a later stage, but for the moment it is enough to note that he has, in addition to
quoting very selectively from the contributions to the debate over the role of the
jury in the late seventeenth century, used statistics derived from records of jury ser-
vice and from the indictments to paint a very bleak picture of an institution in
decline: an institution incapable of acting independently to ﬁnd the facts in crimi-
nal cases and increasingly intimidated by a powerful judiciary.28
John Langbein’s The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial would seem to support
Cockburn’s view, since its sketch of the criminal trial in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries stresses the speed of the arraignments, and the lack of provision of
defense counsel for the accused, and the lack of any rules of evidence.29 Even Lang-
bein’s earlier work on justices of the peace ( JPs) has been interpreted as proving
that jury passivity increased. In this work Langbein analyzed the so-called Bail
and Committal Statutes of Mary Tudor’s reign, 1555 and 1556 respectively, that
required justices of the peace to take pretrial examinations of suspects before either
granting them bail or imprisoning them.30 Elizabeth Hanson has used Langbein’s
earlier work, and Cockburn’s critique of it, to argue that the eﬀect of the Marian
statutes was to deprive the jury entirely of its role in producing, through the verdict,
an account of the truth as they saw it. The legislative force granted to pretrial inves-
tigations by justices of the peace, Hanson writes, made them ‘‘into sorts of Crown
prosecutors.’’ ‘‘In short,’’ she concludes, ‘‘the production of an account of a crime
was now supposed to be in the hands of the investigating justice rather than the
jury.’’31
Why, then, make an issue of the limited application of Foucault’s model of the
production of knowledge/power to the English judicial system? Precisely because,
for all its inadequacies, the English jury system implied a completely diﬀerent epis-
temology; one that I think, came to be integrally associated, in the wake of the
Marian Bail and Committal Statutes, with the very rhetorical structures of proba-
bility on which dramatists were beginning to rely for composing plot and character.
As I shall argue, the developments in pretrial investigation that Elizabeth Hanson’s
Foucauldian argument ﬁnds to be producing the equivalent of France’s top-down
model of state control over criminal investigation may be interpreted quite diﬀer-
ently, especially in relation to the plotting of dramatic narrative, and the representa-
tion of criminal justice on the stage.
In order to understand the distinctive epistemologies of jury trial, as opposed to
trial by the Roman-canon law’s system of proof, we need to start with the diﬀerence
between the ways each system approached the ‘‘witness.’’ In the Roman-canon sys-
tem, as we’ve seen, a witness was part of the tariﬀ of proof. In the German Carolina,
for example, it is stipulated that ‘‘when a crime is proved with at least two or three
credible good witnesses, who testify from a true knowledge, then there shall be . . .
judgement of penal law according to the nature of the case.’’32 In English jury trial,
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however, nothing bound the jury to accept the testimony of witnesses. This free-
dom, which originated in the idea that the jury’s verdict came from their own
knowledge of the facts, modulated into unlimited discretion in the evaluation of
evidence given by witnesses. Thus, Christopher St. German, writing in 1533
against Thomas More, distinguished ‘‘suche witnes, as be sometyme broughte in
to the kingis courtis, to giue euidencis to an enquest’’ from ‘‘the wytnesse . . . in the
spyrytuall courte, that shall acquyte or condempne the parties.’’ In the common
law, ‘‘the iurie be not bounde alwey to folowe tho wytnes . . . For their saying there,
is but as an euidence, whiche the iurie shuld not be bounde to beleue, but as the
truthe is.’’33 St. German’s point, that the ‘‘saying’’ of a witness in a common-law
court was ‘‘but as an euidence’’ became a commonplace.34 A royal proclamation
for jurors, issued in 1607, declared that the law of the realm placed such conﬁdence
in jurors ‘‘as it doeth not absolutely tye them to the evidences and proofes produced,
but that it leaveth . . . the discerning and credit of the Testimonie to the Juries con-
sciences and understanding.’’35
Between 1533 and 1670 jurors ceased to be self-informing and became entirely
reliant on testimony presented in court. Legal historians refer to the jury’s becom-
ing ‘‘passive,’’ but contemporaries naturally did not characterize their role in this
way. Indeed, where Foucault portrays an ancien re´gime epistemology of judgment
based on a medieval canonist tradition of ‘‘knowledge of the truth, knowledge of
the oﬀender, knowledge of the law,’’ the sixteenth-century English epistemology of
judgment could rather be said to be based, as Barbara Shapiro has written, on
‘‘great faith both in witness observers and in jurors as ‘judges of fact,’ ’’ that is, as
evaluators of contradictory witness-testimony.36 Although Langbein’s research on
the rise of the justice of the peace as pretrial investigator has been interpreted as
producing the justice as equivalent to a continental crown prosecutor, his own argu-
ment actually speciﬁes that the passing of Marian Bail and Committal Statutes
breathed new life into jury trial, shaping a diﬀerent role for the trial jury as evaluators
of evidence. The requirement that JPs examine suspects and bind witnesses to testify,
he proposed, tended to organize the oral production of evidence ready for the
trial.37 From 1557 onward, chapters on ‘‘Evidens’’ appear in books on criminal
procedure, such as Sir William Staundforde’s Les Plees del Coron (1557) and Ferdi-
nando Pulton’s De Pace Regis et Regni (1609).38 The wording of indictments, and
records of justices taking recognizances, make it clear that the witnesses were
bound to bring evidence before the jury.39 Hanson argues that the rise of pretrial
investigation by justices of the peace is, like the sudden and transitory appearance
of torture as part of political criminal procedure in this period, symptomatic of a
more general ‘‘rise towards hegemony in this period of . . . ‘analytico-referential
discourse’: discourse that assumes that truth is an objective condition, external both
to the mind that perceives it and the language that describes it.’’40 This formulation
elides the rhetorically based discourse of probability from which the scientiﬁc dis-
course of fact emerged. Though Hanson argues that the ‘‘developing practices of
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criminal investigation’’ in the period ‘‘began to make both the facts of the crime
and the guilt of the perpetrator objects of mystery and methodical discovery,’’ this
argument occludes the participation of lay jurors in the ﬁnding of ‘‘fact’’ that, pace
Hanson’s use of the term, was thought of not as an object of methodological discov-
ery, but as a contentious or conjectural issue. A ‘‘fact’’ was a deed allegedly done.
So, as Barbara Shapiro puts it, ‘‘ ‘fact’ in the legal context did not mean an estab-
lished truth but an alleged act whose occurrence was in contention.’’41
Hanson’s lack of interest in the dialogic process by which legal ‘‘truth’’ was
supposed to emerge is clear from her glossing of the word ‘‘boult’’: ‘‘boult,’’ she says,
means ‘‘sift’’ and is a synonym for ‘‘try.’’ However, sixteenth-century uses of the
word ‘‘boult’’ suggest a deﬁnitive connection between ‘‘sifting’’ and pro-et-contra
argument, as when Sir Thomas Smith writes, in explanation of having composed
his Discourse of the Commonweal dialoguewise: ‘‘that kind of reasoning seems to me
best for boulting out of the truth which is used byway of dialogue or colloquy, where
reasons be made to and fro, as well for the matter intended as against it.’’ Similarly,
Sir Matthew Hale writes in praise of jury trial, as opposed to Roman-canon trial
by witnesses, ‘‘that by this Course of . . . open Examination, there is Opportunity
for . . . any of the Jury . . . to propound occasionalQuestions, which beats and boults
out the Truth much better than when the Witness only delivers a formal Series of
his knowledge without being Interrogated.’’42
Poetic Invention and
Legal Concepts of Probability
For my purposes, the most signiﬁcant consequence of the statutory re-
quirement that justices take pretrial examinations is the way in which that require-
ment focuses attention on the rhetorical probability of any given narrative of the
facts. Examining suspects and binding witnesses to give evidence to the jury meant
that justices were required to be aware of problems of coherence, consistency, and
motivation, indeed, of the arguability of likelihood in any case. Thus, the Surrey justice
of the peace Bostock Fuller records examining Thomas Kyllock, having accused
Edward Rogers, ‘‘vppon a verye slyght suspicion of ﬀelonye of stealing of a horse,’’
which, he says, ‘‘being examined on bothe sydes before me hathe noe probabilytye
& the sayde Thomas dothe now relinquyshe his accusacon in that kynde & dothe
onely accuse him of suspicion for being in an Alehouse at Blechingly in suspicious
manner.’’43 The fact that Justices routinely took such examinations after 1557
meant that they were necessarily made aware of the resemblance between their
analysis of evidential probability and the rhetorical techniques of probable argu-
ment disseminated by such texts as Cicero’s De Inventione and Quintilian’s Institutio
Oratoria. These treatises were translated and adapted to the uses of rhetoric gener-
ally, though in fact they were speciﬁcally concerned with forensic rhetoric, with
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establishing a case for the guilt or innocence of the defendant in a legal case.44
Both Cicero’s and Quintilian’s works stress that the orator’s goal is the probable or
plausible narration of facts in the law courts, and both devote a considerable
amount of space to the analysis of techniques of proof, which are very nearly coex-
tensive with what we think of as rhetorical invention. Quintilian divides his techni-
cal or artiﬁcial proofs into signa aut argumentis aut exemplis (‘‘signs, arguments or
examples’’), and signs are further divided according to their degrees of certainty
(that is, pregnancy is a certain sign of intercourse, but bloodstains may be the sign
of slaying a victim or of a nosebleed). Arguments include enthymemes, but also the
‘‘places’’ of argument (argumentorum loci ), which may either be attributes of the fact
(such as cause, time, place, occasion, means) or of the person (such as birth, nation-
ality, sex, fortune, kin, disposition, habits, friends, and so forth). Here Quintilian’s
treatment overlaps withCicero’s discussion of inference (coniectura) or suspicion (sus-
picio) in book 2 of De Inventione, which concerns what in common law is the ‘‘issue
of fact,’’ what Cicero calls the ‘‘conjectural state of the case.’’ Cicero suggests the
usefulness of these forensic strategies to poets and dramatists. He writes, for exam-
ple, of the importance of establishing the credibility of an impulse if one is arguing
that the accused did something on impulse.45
It is crucial that we appreciate how quickly these techniques were disseminated
in sixteenth-century England, and not just in Latin, or to an elite.Quintilian’s argu-
ments about proof entered schoolboy consciousness through Erasmus’s De copia,
whence they inﬂuenced vernacular writing.46 Grammar-schoolboys read the plays
of Terence with commentaries that analyzed the plays’ comic deceptions according
to Quintilian’s schematization of proofs; some of those same schoolboys went on to
write vernacular drama, others went on to work in the courts, or served as jurors.47
English justices of the peace responded to the new duties imposed on them by the
Bail and Committal Statutes by turning to the very same discussions of artiﬁcial
proof.William Lambarde’s 1581Eirenarcha, a popular andmuch-reprintedmanual
for justices of the peace, was expanded in its 1588 edition to include a much fuller
discussion, in book 2, chapter 7, of the examination of suspects for felony, including
a table of the ‘‘causes of Suspition,’’ which, as Barbara Shapiro explains, is an easy-
to-follow diagram of Cicero’s discussion of the conjectural state of a case.48 As Sha-
piro notes, schemes similar to Lambarde’s are found in Richard Crompton’s en-
largement of Sir Anthony Fitzherbert’s L’Oﬃce et Aucthoritie de Justices de Peace, in
Thomas Wilson’s Arte of Rhetorique, and in Michael Dalton’s The Country Justice.49
Jury Trial: Hearing and Judging
Witnesses on Both Sides
The question that necessarily arises at this point concerns the accessibil-
ity of this discourse of suspicion and probability to the jury, who were judges of the
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fact. Here we need to return to Cockburn’s inﬂuential arguments, which, insisting
that juries were the passive instruments of the judiciary, incapable of exercising
judgment, have caused literary critics to ignore the possibility that participation in
the justice system diﬀused concepts of fact-ﬁnding and equitable judgment through
the culture. Against Cockburn’s arguments, we need to consider those of Thomas
Green and Cynthia Herrup, which tend in the opposite direction. It is ﬁrst impor-
tant to register that there were two kinds of jury: a ‘‘grand jury,’’ whose function it
was to consider bills of indictment drawn up by clerks of assize on the presentment
of evidence from justices and victims of crime, and a ‘‘petty’’ or ‘‘trial’’ jury, who
heard witnesses on both sides in open court, and delivered the verdict based on the
evidence they had heard. If the grand jury decided the evidence was suﬃcient for
a trial to take place, they endorsed the indictment as a billa vera, or a true bill, and
if there was not enough evidence, they returned it as ignoramus. A billa vera meant
the case went to trial before the ‘‘petty’’ or ‘‘trial’’ jury.
The initiative in identifying a crime and bringing it to the notice of the grand
jury was shared by constables, justices, and ordinary people. While the direct par-
ticipation of the victims in bringing charges might seem to give a charter to per-
sonal vengeance, Cynthia Herrup argues that in practice ‘‘a rudimentary notion
of probable cause’’ acted as a restraint; ‘‘grand juries,’’ she notes, ‘‘repeatedly show
their preference for cases based on solid, witnessed detection over those built from
circumstantial inference.’’50 Notions of probability, then, informed practices of in-
vestigation bywronged parties, even before an indictment was endorsed. Andwhile
Cockburn bases part of his case against the adequacy of jury trial on sources critical
of the grand juries, it seems that what these critics objected to was the grand juries’
habit of foreclosing the possibility of a full and open trial of the evidence in a court,
by dismissing a murder indictment as an accidental slaying ‘‘per infortuniam,’’ thus
taking it upon themselves to judge the facts of the case instead of leaving it to the
trial jury. Zachary Babington’s Advice to Grand Jurors in Cases of Blood (1677), which
draws on his forty years’ experience as a clerk to the assizes in Oxford, says repeat-
edly that grand jurors should not think they are bound by their oaths to ‘‘observe the
Circumstances of every Fact before them,’’ but are to leave those circumstances to the
judgment of the trial jury on the oral presentation of evidence.51 While the accused
may prove innocent and the charge may ‘‘lessen and decrease . . . even to nothing,
upon a full Examination and Debate of the whole matter, by hearing of Parties,
and Witnesses, of both sides, and receiving . . . such a scrutiny and narrow search
. . . into all the circumstances and aggravations of the Oﬀence,’’ it is not up to the
grand jury to anticipate this ‘‘full Examination and Debate,’’ mainly because the
grand jury only hears accusing witnesses, and hears them in a private chamber, not
in the public courtroom.52 If there seem to be extenuating circumstances, Babing-
ton goes on, such as the accused being a child, it is ‘‘not the Grand Jury (who see
not the Child) but the Court and the other Jury shall inspect the Child, shall judge
whether . . . upon hearing him speak, he may be thought capable of malice.’’53
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Clearly, then, Babington’s criticism of the grand jury is not proof that the petty or
trial jury was thought incapable of judging evidence; it is rather proof that both
grand jury and trial jury were thought capable of this, but that only the trial jury
had access to witnesses of both sides, to a full, public debate, and to hearing the
accused speak.54
Amain plank in Cockburn’s case against the possibility that juries were capable
of judging evidence is his ﬁnding of numerous inconsistencies in the surviving in-
dictments for the Home Circuit. He notes a dramatic case in 1616 in which a man
was convicted at the Sussex assizes on an indictment alleging simply larceny at
Horsham, Sussex, when a clerk’s note on the indictment read, ‘‘it appeared upon
evidence that this was robbery upon the highway in Surrey,’’ a much more serious
oﬀence, and less likely to be regarded with clemency by the jury.55 However, the
discrepancy between indictments and what emerged as evidence in the oral trial
does not seem necessarily to invalidate the jury’s consideration of evidence. Zach-
ary Babington said endorsing the indictment as billa vera only meant endorsing
‘‘that which for substance seems to them (prima facie) to be a probable truth . . .
although they have no proof of all the Aggravations and Circumstances that attend
the Fact,’’ because this evidence may appear upon ‘‘the further enquiry of another
Jury.’’ Babington quotes Sir Edward Coke’s important distinction between indict-
ment and oral trial: ‘‘An Indictment is no part of the Tryal, but an Information . . . For by
Law the Tryal in that case is not by Witnesses, but by the Verdict of Twelve men, and so a
manifest diversity between the Evidence to a Jury, and a Tryal by a Jury.’’ Addressing the
jury on the Overbury murder trial, Coke warned, ‘‘Jurors were not to expect a direct
and precise proof of every point laid in the Indictment.’’56
Another of Cockburn’s arguments against the jury’s ability to exercize responsi-
ble judgment is based on the speed of felony trials. Sir Thomas Smith’sDe Republica
Anglorum suggested that only two or three prisoners were tried before a single jury,
but Cockburn ﬁnds that that number grew between 1559 and 1588 to reach amaxi-
mum, on average, of eight before it began again to decline. On the strength of such
ﬁgures, he concludes, there is ‘‘no way in which meaningful jury discussion could
have taken place.’’ Thomas Green, however, points out that jurors deliberated not
after each case but toward the end of a two- or three-hour period of testimony; for
the few diﬃcult cases, he concludes, there may have been ample time.57 William
Walwyn, defending jury trial against Henry Robinson’s proposal to do away with
it in 1651, argued, against Robinson’s objection, that keeping deliberating jurors
without victuals increased the possibility of false verdicts. He argued that ‘‘they
have had time enough at Trial . . . to be fully satisﬁed from the examination of
Witnesses, in the right state of the Cause; which then they are to look to, and to
clear all their scruples by what questions they please . . . before they discharge Wit-
nesses.’’58 There are instances of the jurors retiring to deliberate and then returning
to ask further questions concerning the facts. A manuscript report of a case at the
Old Bailey in 1616, in which a servant was arraigned for have taken diverse belong-
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ings from her mistress and placed them within a trunk, records that ‘‘the jury in
this case departed from the bar and returned and asked the advice of the court,
whether it was proved that the trunk was removed out of the house for any of this
time.’’59 Clearly the jury wanted, in spite of the evidence for felonious intent, to
argue that the case was not one of burglary on the grounds that nothing was ac-
tually removed from the house. In this case, as in the others reported in the same
manuscript, the jury was deliberating and trying to exercise a kind of equitable
judgment.
The Old Bailey cases recorded in this manuscript, probably written by the
young barrister Arthur Turnour, are revealing in relation to another of Cockburn’s
arguments, which is that the jury—which he describes as ‘‘illiterate, impression-
able, inexperienced’’—was increasingly, in this period, intimidated by the bench,
and so could not have given verdicts based on their own judgment of the probabili-
ties. Cockburn himself oﬀers statistics to show that jury literacy increased rapidly
over the seventeenth century.60 Evidence for the intimidation of juries, however,
cuts both ways. If, as Cockburn argues, jurors were being sent to Star Chamber
from the 1580s and through James’s reign for ﬁnding fact contrary to the judge’s
view of the evidence, then this in itself is evidence not of jury passivity but of an
ongoing struggle between bench and jurors, between the oﬃcial deﬁnitions of cul-
pability, and the views of the community.61 Thomas Green’s Verdict According to Con-
science narrates a shift in the means juries used to ‘‘nullify,’’ as he puts it, the rigor
of the oﬃcial law on homicide.
Throughout the medieval period, patterns of jury acquittal suggest a discrimi-
nation, which anticipated the later legal distinction between murder and man-
slaughter, between acts of homicide that had oﬀended against the standards of the
community and those of a less serious nature. Transformations in the sixteenth
century, particularly the shift from a self-informing jury to a trial based on evi-
dence, increased the scope for judicial instruction of juries, as well as for judicial
intimidation, making this kind of jury discretion more diﬃcult to exercise without
an evidential basis. However, developments that led to the decision in Bushel’s Case
(1671), that a judge may not punish or threaten to punish any juror for his verdict,
tell a tale not of jury passivity, but of case after case of confrontation between jury
and bench over the implications of the evidence. Moreover, although Bushel’s Case
emerged from confrontation between judge and jury over the political trial of the
QuakersWilliamMead andWilliam Penn, the history of judicial intimidation lead-
ing up to it included cases of homicide, in which juries were said to have encroached
on the judge’s privilege of ﬁnding law rather than fact, because they brought a ver-
dict of death ‘‘per infortunium,’’ or by misadventure, when the judge would have it
murder. In other words, the question of fact-ﬁnding involved inferences about in-
tent, and it was, as Green writes, ‘‘this problem that lay at the heart of future ten-
sions between judge and jury.’’62 When considerations of intent mitigate decisions
about guilt, what is taking place is equitable judgment. As Bernadette Meyler has
43Rethinking the ‘‘Spectacle of the Scaﬀold’’
shown, seventeenth-century debates on the role of the jury increasingly ascribed
to it the conscionable, equitable role once ascribed to the Lord Chancellor in Chan-
cery.63 Nor was this kind of confrontation between judge and jury over questions
of guilt limited to homicide cases. The cases recorded by Turnour in 1616 show
juries being intimidated by the judge, Thomas Coventry, but trying all the while
to make equitable distinctions on the evidence. In one case, where three men were
indicted for burglary, but ‘‘the evidence proved that only one brake the house and
tooke the goodes,’’ the jury found only that one guilty of burglary, and the rest of
larceny, which was ‘‘capable of clergy.’’ But Coventry opposed them, and obliged
them to ﬁnd all three guilty of burglary.64 Finally, in the late-seventeenth-century
literature on the importance of the jury as an instrument of resistance to political
tyranny, we ﬁnd not only that jury trials from the reigns of Elizabeth and James
have become part of a narrative of intimidation and resistance but also that the
ordinary practice of decision-making in felony cases has become the basis for a
theory of the jury’s capacity to decide both law and fact. ‘‘Is it not every Day’s
practice,’’ asks John Hawles in The Englishman’s Right,
that when Persons are indicted for Murther, the Jury does not only ﬁnd them guilty or not
guilty, but many times, upon hearing and weighing of the Circumstances, brings them in
either guilty ofMurther, Manslaughter, per Infortunium, or se defendendo, as they see Cause? Now
do they not herein complicately [sic] resolve both Law and Fact?’’65
As Matthew Hale wrote, ‘‘the Jurors are not only Judges of Fact, but many times
of the truth of Evidence, and if there be just Cause to disbelieve what a Witness
swears, they are not bound to give their verdict according to the Testimony of
that Witness.’’66
Enough has been said, I hope, to show that the epistemology of the jury trial,
with its hearing of witnesses on both sides, and its contested freedom to evaluate
witness testimony both as to the fact and the question of felonious intent, diﬀered
in signiﬁcant ways from the epistemology of the inquisitorial trial described by Fou-
cault in Discipline and Punish, in which the sworn testimony of a witness was part of
a calculable tariﬀ of proof totaled up in secret by a professional judge. Moreover,
English writers on the common law liked to suggest that their oral trial bore a closer
resemblance to the forensic oratory of the Roman republic than did the continental
inquisitorial trial. Sir Thomas Smith’s De Republica Anglorum, written in Toulouse,
emphasizes as the main distinction between the English ‘‘common’’ and French
‘‘civilian’’ systems the fact that the English witnesses and evidences are heard
‘‘openly, that not only the xij, but the Judges, the parties and as many as be present
may heare what ech witnesse doeth say . . . Although this may seem strange to our
civillians now, yet who readethCicero andQuintilianwell shall see there was no other
order or maner of examining witnesses or deposing among the Romans in their
time.’’67 At criminal jury trial, Smith glosses what witnesses say as ‘‘indices or tokens
which we call in our language evidence.’’68 Given Smith’s earlier reference toQuin-
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tilian, it seems likely that his translation of evidence as indices here refers to Quintil-
ian’s discussion of probabilities, also called by Quintilian signa non necessaria, indicia
or vestigia (traces). In Smith’s account, then, the open jury trial, conducted in the
vernacular and based on jury evaluation of the indices or probable signs, was
thought to hold a deﬁning place in the Republica Anglorum, just as the centrality of
forensic oratory had deﬁned the Roman republic, its imperial decline marked, in
Quintilian’s view, by the decline of its regard for forensic techniques of proof.
The Displaced Jury Trial
in Titus Andronicus
I want now to oﬀer a reading of Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus as a play
that presents political tyranny as the refusal of an open hearing of the evidence.
The example of Titus Andronicus might seem perverse, given the play’s tendency to
be read, by critics as far apart ideologically as Francis Barker and John Dover Wil-
son, as continuous with and exploitative of the hangman’s trade rather than as tak-
ing a critical interest in the political importance of participation in the criminal
justice system.69 Even more recently, Karen Cunningham’s Foucauldian reading
of Titus has developed her analysis of Marlowe’s drama in similarly arguing that
Shakespeare’s mutilated bodies work to unsettle the Tudor monarchies’ uses of
spectacular public executions to uphold their own authority and truth.70 My sug-
gestion, however, would be that such an interpretation gives us no insight into why
the play’s action follows the precisely plotted temporal sequence that it does. The
play’s temporal shape or plot, in other words, is conceived as an adaptation of the
error-based plot of Roman comedy to the form of a jury trial.71 The errors of a
comic plot become deceptions as to the facts of a recent homicide, and the middle
acts of the play represent the characters trying to reason out, from the uncertain,
ambiguous probabilities of evidence, what the true facts are. I have already men-
tioned that the schoolroom analysis of Roman or Terentian comedy tended to em-
phasize characters’ uses of the same kinds of probable reasoning from uncertain
signs that Sir Thomas Smith, as we’ve seen, associated both with jury trial and with
a republican conception of the function of oratory. Titus Andronicus is also con-
cerned with the diﬀerence between republican and imperial governments, espe-
cially as distinguished by their systems of justice.72 It used to be thought that the
play’s anachronistic inclusion of both republican and imperial institutions was at-
tributable to its general incompetence, but the republican/imperial contrast plays
out tellingly in the course of the tragedy as the distinction between an open, partici-
patory justice system, and one that, like the Roman-canon law system, precludes
public inquiry and treats artiﬁcial proofs as incrementally adding up to guilt. After
presenting Rome’s rapid fall into imperial, hereditary rule through Titus’s crucial
misjudgment in act 1, scene 1, Shakespeare sets inmotion a version of theTerentian
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erotic intrigue plot as a plot of incrimination, inwhich the villains employ a rhetoric
of probability to frame the guilt of the Andronicii family. The subsequent refusal,
by Rome’s emperor, to allow for an open examination of the deceptive evidence is
followed by scenes of an extraordinary mixture of pathos teetering on the brink of
farce, in which Lavinia’s mutilated and speechless person embodies the uncertainty
of evidence as to the question of her condemned brothers’ guilt. The slow and pain-
ful attempts of Marcus, Titus, and young Lucius to interpret Lavinia’s signs are a
displaced form of inquiry into the evidence denied by oﬃcial justice, the outcome
of which inquiry is communicated to the wider Roman world by the corroborating
proof represented by Aaron’s paternity of Tamora’s child.
The play’s Terentian action, as I see it, begins in what I would call the opening
of act 2 (though Jonathan Bate’s new Arden edition makes this scene continuous
with act 1), a scene in which Tamora’s sons Chiron and Demetrius threaten one
another as competitors for the love of Lavinia, Titus’s daughter, while Aaron, their
mother’s lover, fashions the sons’ libidinous rivalry as instrumental to his own strat-
agem. This scene represents a new departure, the introduction of a distinctly comic,
bustling energy, the kind of energy we associate with intrigue. It follows the play’s
somber, stately, but nonetheless eventful opening, in which Titus, returning victori-
ous fromwar with theGoths to bury twenty-one of his twenty-ﬁve sons in the family
tomb, has also sealed Rome’s terrible political fate by choosing as Rome’s emperor
Saturninus (and with him the principle of primogeniture) instead of Bassanius, who
stood for the principle of popular election. Bassanius’s betrothal to Titus’s daughter,
Lavinia, then hinders Saturninus, who wished to acknowledge Titus’s support by
the usual means of marrying his daughter and allying the Andronicii with the im-
perial throne. In the ensuing tussle over who should marry Lavinia, Titus’s political
fortunes take a decisive turn for the worse when Saturninus, in anger, turns to woo
Tamora, Queen of the Goths, as his empress. As Titus had pitilessly ordered the
slaughter of Tamora’s eldest son in the ﬁrst moments of the play, this sudden eleva-
tion of the Queen of the Goths bodes nothing but ill for his entire family. His lack
of judgment and misplaced trust in authority is once again shown, however, in his
readiness to believe that her intercessions with her husband on his behalf are made
in good faith, and he invites Saturninus and Tamora to join his family in a hunting
party. So when Tamora’s lover, Aaron the Moor, remains onstage to comment on
these violent reversals of political and family fortune after the rest of the cast has
left, we have the sense, I think, not of the continuation of a scene, as Bate’s stage
directions would suggest, but of the play’s shift into a new discursive mode. And
it is this new mode, I would argue, that, as it turns out, is signposted for us as a
gruesome, tragic-farcical version of the erotic intrigue plot of Roman error-based
comedy.
The scene in which Tamora’s sons, Chiron and Demetrius, suddenly, and with-
out motive or dramatic preparation, express love for Lavinia, bears a close struc-
tural resemblance to other English Renaissance imitations of the initiation of Ter-
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entian plots of seduction. In such scenes the association between the erotic impulse
and the prudential, paralogistic course of deception on which the lovers thereafter
embark is expressed structurally in the deliberative dialogue between the lover and
his intimate friend or servant and lexically in various metaphors of deceptive vision
and blindness. For example, in Shakespeare’sTaming of the Shrew, the servant Tranio
shapes the erotic trance of his master Lucentio into an awareness of the need to
assume a disguise in order to have sexual access to Bianca, the object of his af-
fections. ‘‘If you love the maid / Bend thoughts and wits to achieve her,’’ he advises,
and proceeds to outline their predicament.73 Lucentio catches on quickly with a
scheme to gain access to Bianca alone, and ‘‘now ’tis plotted,’’ concludes Tranio
(Taming, 1.1.188). In Titus Andronicus, Aaron replies to Chiron’s protestation,
‘‘Aaron, a thousand deaths would I propose / T’achieve her whom I love,’’ with a
similarly practical question: ‘‘T’achieve her how?’’ (1.1.580). In truly comic plots
(the dialogue between Pyrocles and Musidorus in Sidney’s Old Arcadia is another
example) the deceivers are, of course, young lovers, and the deceit, while its object
is the satisfaction of forbidden desire, is not murderously criminal, or at least not
intentionally so. But for all its generic diﬀerence, Titus employs the same Terentian
shorthand to set up its paralogistic criminal plot. Aaron’s preparation of what
Philip Sidney had called ‘‘the ground-plot’’ of a rhetorical invention comically real-
izes the spatial metaphor: we see him digging, burying gold under a tree. This gold
is, itself, an artiﬁcial proof: an indicium or probable sign, which will help to incrimi-
nate the innocent.74 Aaron’s excavations recall the current spatial sense of ‘‘plot,’’
a word that recurs in these scenes. ‘‘You do but plot your deaths,’’ he had earlier
advised Chiron and Demetrius when dissuading them from seeking to make love
to Lavinia at court (1.1.577). ‘‘The forest walks,’’ he goes on to suggest to them,
‘‘are wide and spacious, / And many unfrequented plots there are, / Fitted by kind
for rape and villainy.’’ (1.1.614–16). ‘‘Plot’’ thus ﬂuctuates between spatial and rhe-
torical senses, and even in its spatial sense is endowed with agency in providing
opportunity for deception and for lack of evidential traces: being ‘‘unfrequented,’’
the forest’s spaces present a contrast with the palace’s plenitude of ‘‘tongues, of eyes,
and ears’’: these plots are ‘‘ruthless, dreadful, deaf and dull’’ (1.1.627–28).
Act 2’s woodland location is thus encoded as ‘‘plot’’ and as a ‘‘plotted’’ series
of events that work to suppress sensory perception, to make the sight ‘‘dull,’’ just as
Terentian rhetorical emplotments of disclosure work, through the uses of artiﬁcial
proof, to beguile the expectations of the audience and to make them believe what
is not before their eyes. Thus Tamora, having praised the forest clearing in which
she meets her lover as a locus amoenus, a place designed for amorous encounter, is
quickly persuaded by him to shift from the delights of eros to the uses of inference,
and her subsequent description of the same place as a ‘‘barren detested vale’’ forms
part of a tour de force of probable reasoning in which she accuses Bassanius and
Lavinia of having lured her to that spot with intent to torture her and enjoins her
sons to avenge this wrong.
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The forest plot, in this curious way, literalizes the Terentian transformation of
seduction into paralogism; we, as audience, have no way of knowing whether it is
‘‘really’’ a delightful or a detestable place. Analogues in earlier and contemporary
plays abound: in John Foxe’s Terentian play, Titus et Gesippus, for example, when
Titus’s wily servant, Phormio, promises to think of a stratagem to ensure Titus’s
appropriation of his best friend’s ﬁance´e, he says he will look up his places of dialec-
tic, so that ‘‘everyone’s eyes can be blinded’’ by his rhetorical powers of deception.
In The Taming of the Shrew, Lucentio describes his plot to possess Bianca as a series
of ‘‘counterfeit supposes’’ that ‘‘bleared’’ the eyes of their fathers (Taming, 5.1.107).
Similar metaphors of sightlessness permeate the rape and murder scenes of Titus.
After Chiron and Demetrius have killed Bassanius, dumping his body into the
stage’s pit and dragging Lavinia oﬀstage, we see Aaron leading Lavinia’s brothers,
Quintus and Martius, to the same pit, with promise of ﬁnding game. Quintus’s
apprehension is expressed as defective vision: ‘‘My sight is very dull, whate’er it
bodes’’ (2.2.195). A similar nonnaturalistic myopia causes Martius to fall, conve-
niently, into the very pit where the corpse of Bassanius lies. This is, again, an almost
comic literalization of the brothers’ readiness to ‘‘fall in’’ with Aaron’s plans, to
capitulate to the plotted opportunity of the time and place. Neither brother exhibits
any power of resistance. When Martius asks his brother to pull him out, Quintus
again grants premonition more power than vision: ‘‘My heart suspects more than
mine eye can see,’’ he replies. The discovery of the dead Bassanius, fulﬁlling the
brothers’ sense of foreboding, causes Quintus, too, to fall into the same trap.
The emperor Saturninus arrives, promptly brought by Aaron to the scene. The
Terentian comic plot, with its sequence of artiﬁcial proofs designed to blind the
fathers and enable rape or consensual adultery, becomes here a test of the father’s—
for which read here the magistrate’s—capacity for just judgment. In this regard,
Saturninus represents, as Heather Kerr has written, ‘‘the dangers inherent in a civil
law procedure,’’ which treats artiﬁcial proofs not as probabilities, but as part of a
penal arithmetic, adding up to certainty.75 Tamora’s production of the letter—ear-
lier described by Aaron as ‘‘this fatal-plotted scroll’’ (2.2.47)—which appears to
incriminate the brothers by referring to the bag of gold hidden under the elder tree,
prompts comparison with Kyd’s Spanish Tragedy. In Kyd’s play, Hieronimo, having
found the body of his son, receives a letter that claims to inform him (truly, as it
happens) of the murderer’s identity. Hieronimo, a judge, refuses to credit the letter
too quickly: ‘‘be not credulous,’’ hewarns himself, resolving that he will ‘‘by circum-
stances try,’’ the letter’s testimony, for it may have been written to ‘‘entrap’’ him
(3.2.48). Saturninus, however, crassly fails to examine the letter he receives. For him
it functions not as an indicium, a probable sign needing further interrogation, but
‘‘as an inartiﬁcial proof.’’76 He deems no further trial necessary: the brothers will
be dragged ‘‘from the pit unto the prison’’ there to languish until ‘‘we have devised /
Some never-heard-of-torturing pain for them’’ (2.2.283–85). The syntax of the next
exchange between Saturninus and Titus emphasizes the way in which the emper-
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or’s actions preempt the time and space of trial and uncertainty, in which evidence
might be questioned, doubts aired, diﬀerent hypotheses advanced. Titus kneels be-
fore Saturninus and begs, ‘‘That this fell fault of my accursed sons, / Accursed if the
fault be proved in them—’’ (2.2.290–91); but the provisional, conditional quality of
the curse is refused by the emperor: ‘‘If it be proved? You see it is apparent,’’ he
insists (2.2.292). It turns out that Titus himself found the letter—an incriminating
detail he freely admits:
I did, my lord, yet let me be their bail,
For by my father’s reverend tomb I vow
They shall be ready at your highness’ will
To answer their suspicion with their lives. (2.2.295–98)
Here, of course, Titus invokes the contemporary practice of the justices of the peace
as laid out by the Marian Bail and Committal Statutes; felony suspects could be
granted bail, provided an examination was taken, witnesses bound over to give
evidence before the jury. Saturninus refuses the request, denying the very category
of ‘‘suspicion’’ that Titus has proposed:
Thou shalt not bail them. See thou follow me.
Some bring the murdered body, some the murderers.
Let them not speak a word: the guilt is plain;
For, by my soul, were there worse end than death
That end upon them should be executed. (2.2.99–303)
The horrors of Saturninus’s reign are encapsulated in this: that mere suspects
should be named murderers and sentenced to a ‘‘worse end than death,’’ without
a moment’s thought given to open trial.
And the extent of that horror is made emblematically apparent in the next
moment of the play, as Chiron and Demetrius bring Lavinia onstage, ‘‘her hands cut
oﬀ and her tongue cut out, and ravished.’’ The young men taunt her with her inability
to reveal their criminality: ‘‘So, now go tell, and if thy tongue can speak, / Who
’twas cut out thy tongue and ravished thee’’; ‘‘Write down thy mind, bewray thy
meaning so’’ (2.3.1–4). There could not be a clearer, nor cruder, symbolism of the
previous scene’s preemption of the possibility of disclosure. Critics have been trou-
bled by the metaphorization of the violence done to Lavinia in what is, in fact,
Marcus’s extraordinarily humane and humanizing speech on encountering her in
the woods.77 Much more troubling, surely, is the jarring violence of the allegorical
representation itself.
The third act of the play opens with a ritualistic reenactment of Saturninus’s
proscription of open trial in the procession of tribunes as judges with Martius and
Quintus in bondage, ‘‘passing’’ as the stage direction says, ‘‘on the stage to the place of
execution, and Titus going before pleading.’’ The scene painfully protracts the inevitable
execution: from the moment of the procession, and the judges’ ignoring of Titus,
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who lies down onstage and continues pleading to the stones of the street, the death
of the brothers is an incontrovertible conclusion. Yet Aaron’s exploitation of Titus’s
desperation opens out an excruciating, not to say torturing, expansion of the time
between sentence and execution. In this interval, discussion betweenMarcus, Luc-
ius, and Titus plays, at ﬁrst indirectly and almost imperceptibly over the question
of evidence. In attempting to reach out to, to feel for, and to understand the silent
Lavinia, Titus and Marcus come to the point of identifying competing hypotheses
of the origin and cause of her pain. Lucius, who falls fainting down at the sight of
his wounded sister, begs her to speak the name of her attacker, and then, under-
standing that she cannot, begsMarcus to speak for her. Titus then characteristically
claims possession of the outrage to his daughter: ‘‘It was my dear, and he that
wounded her / Hath hurt me more than he had killed me dead.’’ His speech turns
to enumeration and demonstration of the wrongs threatening to overwhelm him,
but when he comes to Lavinia’s woes, his summary involves a mention of her broth-
ers that excites a response in her:
Thou hast no hands to wipe away thy tears,
Nor tongue to tell me who hath martyred thee;
Thy husband he is dead, and for his death
Thy brothers are condemned, and dead by this.
Look, Marcus, ah son Lucius, look on her!
When I did name her brothers, then fresh tears
Stood on her cheeks, as doth the honey-dew
Upon a gathered lily almost withered. (3.1.107–14)
Marcus hazards the meaning of Lavinia’s tears: ‘‘Perchance because they killed her
husband, / Perchance because she knows them innocent’’ (3.1.115–16). Critics
write of this play and of this scene without seeming to register at all the radical
quality of the uncertainty that is being represented here.78 We, of course, share
Lavinia’s recollection of the murder of her husband by Chiron and Demetrius, but
Marcus and Titus, at this stage, really do not know whether or not Martius and
Quintus are guilty of the murder of Bassanius, and, if they are, what relation that
guilt bears to the inarticulate sorrow of Lavinia. An exchange that began with Ti-
tus’s selﬁsh desire to monopolize grief becomes, inadvertently, an engagement with
the uncertainty of what Lavinia’s emotions signify. Titus begins to interpret her
tears as signs of the brothers’ innocence: ‘‘No, no, theywould not do so foul a deed: /
Witness that sorrow that their sister makes’’ (3.1.119–20), but his very assurance
sounds tentative. The next sign that Lavinia gives has been obscure even to the
play’s editors. After Aaron’s ludicrously cruel deception of Titus, the heads of
Quintus and Martius are brought onstage. There is, as Bate says, an implied stage
direction at this moment, for Marcus says to Lavinia: ‘‘Alas, poor heart, that kiss is
comfortless / As frozen water to a starved snake’’ (3.1.251–52). Samuel Johnson
introduced a direction for Lavinia to kiss Lucius, which subsequent editors changed
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to Lavinia kissing Titus. Bate, however, acutely realized that Lavinia must here
kiss the heads of her brothers: such a kiss earns Marcus’s sad comment on its lack of
consolation, but this comment shows, in turn, how easily Lavinia’s signs are mis-
read, or ignored. Her kissing of the heads intends not comfort, but expiation, a
demonstration of the brothers’ innocence that remains an uncertain fact in the
minds of her uncle and father.
The unfolding of the following scenes of domestic life among the broken rem-
nants of the Andronicii convey a pathos in the normality of familial relations per-
sisting under such conditions. But that pathos is not, I would argue, the scenes’
primary purpose. The ﬁrst scene of act 4 opens with the son of the banished Lucius,
Titus’s grandson, running away, terriﬁed, from his aunt, who persists in following
him while he is at his studies. Her movements are so pathetically opaque to him
that he fears that her frantic ransacking of his books is a sign of her insanity. Her
object, however, is a text: Ovid’sMetamorphoses. On ﬁrst encountering his wounded
niece, Marcus’s mind had immediately leapt to the textual source of her muteness:
‘‘But sure some Tereus hath deﬂow’red thee, / And lest thou shouldst detect him,
cut thy tongue’’ (2.3.26–27). Lest thou shouldst detect him—althoughMarcus appears
to forget his own detective ingenuity in the scenes intervening between these words
and act 4, it is he who, when Lavinia turns over her nephew’s books, and comes to
Ovid, begins to attend with excitement to her movements. He guesses that she
means there were two rapists, ‘‘Confederate in the fact,’’ and while Titus encour-
ages Lavinia to ‘‘give signs,’’ suggesting that her rapist may have been Saturnine,
‘‘as Tarquin erst,’’ Marcus hits upon the device of enabling Lavinia to hold a stick
steady in her mouth to write in the sand. She scrawls the word ‘‘Stuprum,’’ (sexual
deﬁlement) and the names of Chiron and Demetrius. The language and action that
has intervened sinceMarcus’s accurate surmise of the Philomel-like quality of Lavi-
nia’s ordeal has highlighted, in a quasi-allegorical way, the process of trial, and the
radical uncertainty of knowledge of the ‘‘fact’’ during that process.
Once Lavinia’s signs have become intelligible thus, the fact has, unoﬃcially,
been proved and the guilt of Tamora’s sons is no longer obscure to the Andronicii
family and their supporters. It is still, however, only unoﬃcial knowledge and, as
such, is extremely dangerous in imperial Rome. The play now begins to move to-
ward a more manifest proof of the erotic intrigue within which, as we have seen,
was implied the whole plot of the Andronicii’s downfall. Only at this point does it
become obvious why Shakespeare chose to imagine Tamora’s lover as a Moor. In
the scene after Lavinia’s revelation of the names of the rapists, Titus sends, by way
of young Lucius, a message to Aaron and Tamora’s sons revealing a knowledge of
their guilt. Simultaneously, and without any preparation whatsoever, a nurse brings
onstage Tamora’s newly born baby. The appearance of this baby is described as an
issue: ‘‘a joyful issue,’’ according to Aaron, but the nurse replies that it is a ‘‘black
and sorrowful issue.’’ An issue, as Thomas Blount’s law dictionary of 1670 put it,
‘‘hath divers applications; sometime being used for Children begotten between a
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Man and Wife; . . . some for the point of a matter depending in Suite, whereupon
the Parties joyn, and put their Cause to the Trial of Jury.’’ But Blount insists on the
identity of these diﬀerent signiﬁcations: ‘‘in all these, it has but one signiﬁcation,
which is an eﬀect of a Cause preceeding; as Children are the eﬀect of theMarriage;
[and] . . . the point referr’d to 12 Men is the eﬀect of pleading.’’ In Shakespeare’s
punning conception here, the baby’s coloring will clarify the issue before the jury
in the last act. Paternity in this instance is not, as the old wisdom goes, the para-
digmatic form of conjectural or uncertain knowledge, but a manifest, inartiﬁcial
proof: The baby proves Aaron’s liaison with Tamora, which, as we saw, also gener-
ated their plot. Hence it is that when Aaron brilliantly declaims on the inferiority
of whiteness in a speech defending the life of his son, he characterizes whiteness as
the color that betrays guilt inadvertently, by blushing, while his son’s complexion
announces frankly to his father and to the rest of the world, ‘‘Old lad, I am thine
own’’ (4.2.123). The preservation of Aaron’s son’s life is crucial to the ensuing com-
munication of the facts of his and Tamora’s guilt beyond the immediate circle of
the Andronicus family in Rome, to Lucius and the Goth army, and ﬁnally, to the
‘‘gracious auditory’’ of the Roman citizens in the ﬁnal speeches of the play.
In his essay on the occlusion of violence in the new historical ‘‘poetics of cul-
ture,’’ and in Renaissance tragedy, Francis Barker picked out a curious and chilling
incident from act 4 ofTitus Andronicus, in which a rustic ﬁgure, referred to in speech
headings only as ‘‘the Clown,’’ happens to cross paths with Titus and some of his
friends and kin. Titus in his assumed or real derangement of mind has persuaded
his friends to help him shoot arrows into the air bearing letters to the Olympian
gods with complaints about the departure of Justice from Rome. In the exchange
between Titus and the Clown we learn that the latter is taking pigeons to the tribu-
nal plebs to settle a legal dispute between his uncle and one of the emperor’s men.
Titus asks the Clown to take a supplication to the emperor for him, and he wraps
a knife in it, instructing the Clown to hold the knife ‘‘like an humble suppliant’’
(4.4.116). What happens when the Clown has an audience with the Emperor and
presents himwithTitus’s letters is, as Barker puts it, stunning. TheClown is ‘‘simply
taken away to execution. Without cause given.’’79 It is the uncanny, enigmatic qual-
ity of the horror here that prompts Barker to trawl through the numbers of hangings
recorded in the indictments of the HomeCircuit Assizes for the years of Elizabeth’s
and James’s reigns. The resulting statistics of deaths are indeed sickening, but it
seems tome that Barker is mistaken in arguing that they gloss the otherwise unintel-
ligible incident of the Clown’s arbitrary execution in the play. Barker says that the
incident ‘‘lacks credence according to the positive norms of behavior in the play,’’
but, as I have tried to show, behavior in the play is not grounded in naturalistic
representations of individuals, but gives emotional credibility to what are, in fact,
emblematic dramatizations of political ideas about justice. In this sense, the arbi-
trariness of the Clown’s being sentenced to death is far from unintelligible. His
death sentence is given moments after Saturninus has complained that Titus’s let-
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ters sent to the Gods are politically motivated: ‘‘What’s this but libelling against the
senate / And blazoning our injustice everywhere? A goodly humour, is it not, my
lords? As who would say, in Rome no justice were’’ (4.4.17–20). Of course there is
no justice in Rome, and the Clown’s being held responsible for the message he has
carried from Titus is a vivid example of how Saturninus’s reign of terror maintains
itself by silencing voices of opposition.
The Clown’s message from Titus enrages Saturninus, provoking him to reiter-
ate that Titus’s sons died ‘‘by law for murder of our brother.’’ He next wants Titus
to be dragged ‘‘by the hair’’ before him, no doubt to be dispatched after the manner
of the Clown, but it is after the subsequent arrival of news that the Goths are on
the march, with Titus’s banished son Lucius in command, that his plan changes.
Saturninus fears Lucius because the citizens of Rome favor him; for this reason,
Tamora proposes that she try to ‘‘enchant the old Andronicus,’’ hoping thereby to
persuade him to intercede with his son for Rome’s safety. Tamora, of course, does
not at this point know what the audience knows, which is that the child of which
she has just been delivered is still alive and with Aaron on the outskirts of Rome.
It is this child—proof of their collaboration in stratagems as well as sex—that forms
the center of the next scene, in which Aaron is brought by a soldier of the Goths,
before their commander, Lucius. Lucius threatens to kill the child, but Aaron bar-
gains for its life, oﬀering a frank confession of the all the facts of Bassanius’s murder
and his sister’s rape. By this device, Lucius is put in possession of the crucial knowl-
edge he lacked in act 3, scene 1; he spares the lives of Aaron and the child in order to
have them as corroborative witnesses. In the ﬁnal scene, after Titus has ingeniously
managed to slit the throats of Chiron and Demetrius, baking them in a pie to be
served to their mother, and then killing both Lavinia and Tamora, it is Lucius who,
having killed Saturninus, proceeds to interpret the scene of slaughter to the Ro-
man people:
Then, gracious auditory, be it known to you
That Chiron and the damned Demetrius
Were they that murdered our emperor’s brother,
And they that ravished our sister;
For their fell faults our brothers were beheaded. . . . (5.3.95–100)
Lucius, as he himself admits, digresses into a justiﬁcation of his own joining with
the Goths, but Marcus picks up the address to the jury:
Now is my turn to speak. Behold the child:
Of this was Tamora delivered,
The issue of an irreligious Moor,
Chief architect and plotter of these woes.
The villain is alive in Titus’ house,
And as he is to witness this is true,
Now judge what cause had Titus to revenge
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These wrongs unspeakable, past patience,
Or more than any living man could bear.
Now you have heard the truth: what say you, Romans? (5.3.118–27)
‘‘Behold the child,’’ is as much as to say, ‘‘here is the issue before you.’’ Once again,
the literalization of metaphor edges toward farce: one is reminded of Laurence
Sterne’s account of the decline of eloquence since the days when Roman orators
wore capacious mantles, enabling them to pop out, at the critical moment, the re-
quired material proof: ‘‘a scar, an axe, a sword, a pinked doublet . . . but, above all,
a young infant royally accoutred.’’80 But if the image borders on the absurd, its
audacious embodiment of the intellectual structures of forensic reasoning, like
other more brutal embodiments in the play (Lavinia’s mutilation, the brothers’
falling into the pit), assumes an awareness of both the poetic and political impor-
tance of questions of evidential probability and of the link between judicial and
political participation. And perhaps the most signiﬁcant eﬀect of the construction
of the play’s narrative around the motif of a displaced trial is the emergence, in acts
3 and 4, of a profound sense of the pathos of human beings’ opacity to one another,
a sense that encourages critics and producers to disregard the play’s outrageous
implausibility in the interests of breathing interpretative life into the dramatis per-
sonae as characters. And so, we could perhaps say, out of the forensic structure of
the Renaissance detective plot emerges not Sherlock Holmes, but Hamlet.
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